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Abstract 
This article examines why an Islamic organization appeal into radical behavior? 
Focusing on Ikhwan al-Muslimun (IM) and its splinter groups in Egypt, 
this article seeks to highlight historical-institutional underpinnings of  when 
and how political Islam faced obstacles to enter pragmatic politics. Political 
experiences of  the IM in the 1950s and the institutional structures created 
by Nasser’s regime in the early 1960s have shaped a condition of  uncertainty 
that constrained Islamist activists to twart moderation. Islamist thinkers 
such as Sayyid Qutb exploited the fear of  Nasserism and new emerging state 
institutions, to convince many members that they were threatened by the current 
regime. Initiatives to embrace radical ideology and actions have become dominant 
frameworks in the IM. The extent to which this radical ideology may develop 
is not only because of  these institutional constraints, but also because of  the 
absence of  pragmatic-minded leaders who appealed with non-violence ideas to 
1 This article is part of  our research project of  “Negotiating Democracy: 
Civil Society and the Politics of  Democratization in Egypt and Indonesia.” The 
fieldwork portion of  this project is funded by the Center for Research and Publication 
(PUSLITPEN), the State Islamic University (UIN), Syarif  Hidayatullah, Jakarta, under 
International-Collaborative Research Support in 2017. We would like to express our 
thanks to Wahdi Sayuti who have made the institutional support possible. We are grateful 
to Dadi Darmadi, Jajang Jahroni, and Badrus Sholeh (UIN Jakarta) for their reading 
and comments to the earlier draft of  this article.
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integrate Islamic agenda in institutional opportunities. 
[Tulisan ini membahas organisasi Islam yang cenderung menjadi radikal, studi 
kasus Ikhwan al-Muslimun (IM) dan pecahannya di Mesir, dengan mengulas 
secara organisasional historis disaat Islam politik tersebut mendapat rintangan 
ketika memasuki politik praktis. Pengalaman politik IM tahun 1950an dan 
1960an saat dibawah rezim Nasser telah membawa ketidakpastian dan yang 
menyebabkan para aktifis menjauhi sikap moderat. Seorang Sayyid Qutb  pun 
mengangkat ketakutan pada kekuasaan rezim Nasser untuk meyakinkan 
massa pada sebuah ancaman baru. Cara berpikir dan bertindak radikal telah 
menjadi pilihan yang dominan bagi anggota IM. Kesuburan paham radikal 
tersebut dimungkinkan karena tidak hanya adanya tekanan organisasional, 
tetapi juga tiadanya tokoh politik yang mendorong pendekatan non kekerasan 
dalam integrasikan agenda politik dengan peluang organisasioanal.]
Keywords: Egypt’s politics, Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Islamic state, 
institutions, religious ideas.
A. Introduction
The post Cold War world, especially after the terrorist attack on 
the World Trade Center in New York, on September 11, 2001, there is 
growing concern with Islamic radicalism and extremism perceived as 
the breeding ground for contemporary religious violence. This trend has 
produced a confusion in explaining its emergence, ideas, politics, and in 
categorizing its various components. In this article we explore the political 
origins of  Islamist radicalism, many of  them reflected and amplified in 
the behavior of  Ikhwan al-Muslimun and its splinter groups in Egypt. 
Our argument is that Islamic organizations such as Ikhwan al-
Muslimun originated from a religious-reform movement and a political 
ideology that includes a search for state-formation alternative during the 
late colonial period. An extreme interpretation of  Islam has therefore 
become the spearhead of  religion engaging in a counterattack on secular 
state and Western domination which had reduced its power at that time. 
By drawing on the gradual changes of  state-Islamist relation in Egypt, this 
article seeks to provide an explanation on why militant Islamic ideas and 
radical political actions have emerged in the country’s political landscape? 
We argue that the emergence of  new state system and institutions created 
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by Gamal Abdul Nasser since the late 1950s have created a condition of  
uncertainty that constrained Muslim activists in Egypt. Islamist thinkers 
and ideologues exploited the fear of  Nasserism and the new emerging 
state, and therefore advocated many Islamist cadres to embrace radical 
actions drawing the lines to uphold revolutionary path against the Nasser’s 
state.
Ikhwan al-Muslimun (IM) emerged as leading institution for the 
mobilization of  Islamic state in Egypt. Its foundation marked three 
important concerns in Egyptian politics and society: the 1924 abolition of  
Islamic Caliphate, strong appeal of  Western-liberal thoughts that resulted 
in attack on Islamic faith, and continued presence of  British occupation 
in Egypt’s independence. The understanding of  this early episode of  
initial rise and failure of  liberal experiments under Westernized elite 
provide a background for the analysis of  organizational characters of  the 
IM. It allows us to establish proposition that, the declining legitimacy of  
Egyptian state and its secular foundation of  national identity breed the 
founders of  the IM to revitalize Islam as an alternative for state formation.
We adopt historical-institutional approach in this study to argue 
that it is the role played by the institutions of  Nasser’s regime—including 
social, political and constitutional ones—that facilitated the changing 
character of  mobilization for Islamic state.2 By establishing these 
institutional responsibilities and relationship to other actors’, the processes 
of  ideology creation, transformation, and the strategy for mobilization 
will be portrayed at the IM’s choice to stand against the secular state. 
We admit that scholars on Islamic politics have developed approaches 
to the study of  radicalism. However, most theoretical discussions have 
focused on Islamic ideology and particular set of  political development. 
It is interesting to note that although many dimensions of  politics are 
embedded in the mechanism of  Islamic radicalization processes, they 
ignored the dynamic of  institutions developed during Nasser’s regime 
that shaped the changing behavior of  the IM and their activists.
Institutions, therefore, are a central point in our analysis to 
2 Historical institutionalism has been used to analyze many contemporary 
political phenomena. The topic varies, from political economy, state formation, 
secession, to the study of  political regime. For comprehensive elaboration on this 
approach, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three 
New Institutionalisms”, Political Studies, vol. 44, no. 5 (1996), pp. 936–57.
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interrogate the processes of  ideology creation, transformation, and 
politicization which serve as analytical core in the politics of  Islamic 
movements. We define institution here as a materialized structure 
of  the nation-state.3 This definition refers to what Peter A. Hall4, a 
scholar who developed institutional analytical frameworks, recalled 
as an analysis which seeks to conceive institutions “as the formal, 
informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions embedded in 
the organizational structure of  the polity (institutions) can range from 
the rules of  a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures 
of  a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behavior”. 
By recognizing these institutional environments in crucial phase of  state 
formation we will be positioned to understand the lineages of  Islamic 
extremism and violence in Egypt.
This article therefore employs three perspectives to interrogate our 
case within the historical institutional framework. First is authoritarian 
politics perspective which argues that common national basis for 
modern state require a strong regime, usually military, to uphold national 
integration. By stressing on the cultural history of  national groups, this 
article suggests that Islamist movements define themselves by reference 
to a particular teaching of  religious glory. Should they embrace a national 
concept which is in the intersection of  their religious identity controlled 
by members of  non-religious leadership, they will defend their inalienable 
rights to retain control of  their own culture, ideas and identities.5 Second 
is social economic deprivation. It argues that Muslim politics has its roots 
in the uneven nations’ economic development between the modern 
nation-states and the traditional, religious societies. Such a relationship 
may be the result of  “modernization policies” undertaken by the new 
states. Perceptions of  relative deprivation may develop, and they generate 
demands for a “better bargain” from religious clerics and their institutions. 
3 Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, “Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Politics”, in Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, 
ed. by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992).
4 Hall and Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms”, p. 17.
5 John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984); 
Y. Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of  Islamic Revival”, in Voices of  Resurgent Islam, ed. 
by John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 67–98.
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If  the demands are ignored, these religious societies will call for rebellion 
legitimated by reference to religious-secular differences.6 Third, the 
middle class thesis which argues that new emerging Muslim middle class 
seek to promote their interest in politics by acting as religious-political 
activists. These members of  middle class are identified as the educated 
youth to uphold control in political arena.7 Rather than taking a side in 
single theoretical framework, we take eclectic position to combine those 
perspectives in explaining the origins of  Islamic extremism. 
B. Politics, Ideology, and State-Formation in Egypt: A Historical 
Background
Before the 20th century Egyptian society was traditional and 
religious in character, and yet the circumstances in which the modern 
state was formed have been such as to promote the identification of  the 
state with political ideology embraced by dominant elite landed-class 
associated with liberal, secular vision of  the state. Muslim majority of  
the populace have been sidelined from being the back bone of  the state 
formation processes, both in the sense that the early initiative of  anti-
colonial organizations for statehood came to be virtually monopolised 
by the liberal landed-elite and, more importantly, in the westernizing 
character of  national constitution. In the Egypt’s cultural context, liberal 
governments under monarchy were perceived as both British-backed 
national state and an agent for the secularization of  Egyptian society.
The process of  state formation in modern Egypt can be traced back 
to the long period of  the country’s struggle for independence since the 
first half  of  the 20th century. British domination of  Egyptian national life 
had increased exponentially since their occupation of  Egypt which began 
in 1882. By 1906, growing levels of  popular discontent with British rule 
led to a period of  national political and economic crisis that would not end 
until the military coup of  1952. Historians of  Egypt noted that while the 
new emerging political parties were seeking to claim for themselves the 
mantle of  ‘defender of  Egyptian sovereignty’, they were simultaneously 
6 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic 
World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 2003).
7 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Political Change 
in Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002).
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being wracked by internal divisions that prevented them from effectively 
handling the social and economic problems of  the pre-independence 
period.8 Prolonged and seemingly intractable political and social turmoil 
in Egypt engendered searching national self-analysis, particularly among 
its political elite, its intellectuals and ulama, as regards the sources of  the 
country’s degradation at the hands of  European powers.
From this period of  crisis, new social, religious, and political 
movements emerged in the early 20th century organized along two 
ideological lines: Islamic reformism9 and liberalism.10 Both camps felt that 
modernization of  the Egyptian state was a social good, but they differed 
as to how it could best be achieved. Leaders of  both ideological camps 
also felt that the Western constitutional system of  governance could be 
a model of  reform that would benefit Egypt, but they differed as regards 
how they should adopt the system and reconcile it with Islamic tradition. 
Important social groups behind the call for the liberal constitution were 
Egypt’s landed elite, British civil administrators, judges, and other new 
middle-class actors who had graduated from Western-style Egyptian 
8 Bruce K. Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in 
the Arab World (Princeton: Princeton University Pres, 2008), pp. 14–6. Historians of  
Egypt consider this period as moments of  identity crisis in nation building. It was the 
result of  numerous factors linked to the process of  modernization initiated a century 
earlier by Muhammad Ali, the Ottoman governor of  semi-independent Egypt. He came 
to power in 1803, and later continued by his successor, Khedive Ismail (1863-1879). 
These two founders of  modern Egypt had initiated far reaching economic, political 
and military reforms to industrialize Egypt along Western lines.
9 The Islamic reformists were led by Muslim thinkers such as Muhammad 
Abduh (1848-1905) and later, Rashid Ridha (1868-1935). These reformers advocated 
revitalizing Islam and adapting it to modern conditions. The Muslim reformists held, 
Egyptian could find models of  effective governance and spirit of  scientific progress that 
would form the basis for selective borrowing from the West. See Albert Hourani, Arabic 
Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
10 The prominent figures of  liberalism were composed of  Western-oriented 
intellectuals who were educated in the West or, at least, graduated from Western-style 
of  learning institutions in Egypt. They include Thaha Husein, Mohammad Haykal, 
and Mufti as Sayyid. At the forefront of  liberal political movement was the Wafd Party 
(Delegation Party). When the party was established in 1919, it was called originally with 
the Hizb al Amni, which means the Secular Party.
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schools.11 
These forces helped to ensure that the Constitution of  1923 
followed the spirit of  European Enlightenment ideals, and reflected three 
clear principles of  modern statecraft: the state being constrained by laws 
that define the purpose and scope of  state power and through checks 
and balances on its constituent parts; the society being governed by the 
principle of  “the rule of  law”; and the state guaranteeing the rights of  its 
citizens, including the protection of  freedom of  speech, assembly, and 
religion.12 Importantly, the British-Ottoman agreement that followed the 
collapse of  the Ottoman Empire after World War I officially kept Egypt a 
British colony. Thus the Ottoman Khedive (Muhammad Ali dynasty) “was 
now recognized as a king, and, under British military protection, headed 
a state based on a model from European constitutional monarchies”.13 
Egypt continued to be governed in this fashion until the Free Officers’ 
coup in 1952.
From its inception, the liberal constitution faced serious challenges. 
The problem of  “rule of  law” was an issue in Egypt following the British 
attempt to force the King to adopt a European code of  law.14 Moreover 
the adoption of  the new constitution outraged many Egyptians, who 
perceived the King as a British pawn due to his decision to adopt a code 
not based on Islamic law. The ulama responded to this constitution by 
forcefully re-entering the political scene, defending their authority by 
insisting that the national law of  Egypt should be based on a codified 
body of  Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh.15 But the marginalization of  ulama 
that has taken place since Mohammed Ali’s modernization policies, 
coupled with the expansion of  Western education and ideas, meant that 
their message was relatively easy to ignore. Indeed, the adoption of  a 
11 Clark Benner Lombardi, “State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The 
Amendment of  Egyptian Constitution and the Article 2 of  Jurisprudence of  the 
Supreme Constitutional Court of  Egypt’”, Ph.D Dissertation (Columbia: Columbia 
University, 2001), p. 74.
12 Ibid., pp. 81–98.
13 Ibid., p. 119.
14 Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab 
World, pp. 40–2.
15 Daniel Neil Crecelius, “The Ulama and the State in Modern Egypt”, Ph.D 
Dissertation (Princeton: Princeton University, 1967), pp. 146–54.
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liberal constitution became in effect the blow to the ulama’s previously 
prominent place in public affairs. As Petersen pointed out, by the 1920s, 
the “traditional ulama and their guilds became a weak institution, largely 
without influence in the political affairs”.16
It was under these circumstances, the post-Ottoman Egypt being 
torn between its liberal constitution and one based on Islamic law that, 
the idea of  the Islamization of  the modern state through constitutional 
means began to circulate. This idea produced an impetus for further 
elaboration of  certain aspects of  Islamic constitutional thought.17 Around 
a dozen organizations were established mostly adopted the “renaissance 
of  Islam” in their names and advocated “Islam as an alternative of  
state formation”.18 These organizations might have differed in terms of  
social base and forms, but shared common rejection of  Egypt’s liberal 
constitution. They also sought a total transformation of  Egyptian state 
espousing for Islamic shari’a as the corner stone of  the political aspiration 
of  these organizations.
In this period too, new elites emerged echoing patterns found in 
many other parts of  the colonial Middle East. When formal independence 
of  Egypt was gained in 1923 but signalled a continued presence of  the 
British rule a growing anti-secular, anti-liberal state began to materialize. 
A number of  political organizations thus sprang as alternatives of  state 
formation: the radical right wing of  nationalists, Misr al Fata (Young 
Egypt), modeled on the fascism in Gemany and Italy, organized in 
1930; The Association of  Muslim Youth (Jama’at al-Shubban al Muslimun, 
YMMA) was founded in 1927. Between 1927 and 1935 around a hundred 
organizations were established. They adopted the renaissance of  Islam in 
16 Ibid., p. 101. The ulama, especially those affiliated with the Azhar, were 
largely sidelined politically. The struggle for the institutionalization of  Islamic law 
in modern Egypt came to be led by “modern emerging activists”. In the 1930s, the 
struggle for an Islamic state was gradually transformed into a popular cause under 
the inspiration of  this new type of  Muslim generation. See, Christina Phelps Harris, 
Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of  the Muslim Brotherhood (Berkeley: Stanford 
University Press, 1964), pp. 41–2.
17 Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab 
World, p. 73.
18 Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt, p. 141.
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their names.19 Other left organizations that composed of  the communists 
and socialists were formed in the early 1930s. These include a secret 
organization within middle-rank military personnel that later came to 
be known Free Officers movement. All these organizations differed in 
terms of  social base and ultimate goals, but shared common rejection 
of  liberal constitutional state and “a need for capable and energetic 
leadership for Egypt”.20
It was under this calamitous political situation and economic 
hardship of  much of  the working population in Egypt that a fairly small 
religious association was founded: the Society of  the Muslim Brothers. 
Founded in Isma’iliyya in 1928 by a school teacher, Hasan al-Banna 
(1906-1949), the Ikhwan al-Muslimun was designed initially as a social 
organization conceived in religious term as “a living community…for 
religious and moral reform to (spreading) the message of  Islam”.21 Like 
other intellectuals of  his time, Hasan al-Banna was concerned about 
the state of  the Egyptian nation and society. In many of  his opinion, 
contemporary Egypt was epitomized by political turmoil and disunity, 
increasing moral laxity, decreasing respect for tradition and religion. In a 
response to the increasing influence of  liberalism, Hasan al-Banna even 
noted, “Egypt has witnessed the widespread enthusiasm for Western 
secular culture among the upper and middle classes”.22 
As a larger part of  anti-British occupation and a reaction to the 
decline of  liberal state, the IM envisioned Islam as an alternative solution 
for the state crisis. Hasan al-Banna repeatedly advocated a rapid transition 
to a full independence and “called for the establishment of  a government 
derived from Islamic constitutions”.23 Distinctive programs in various 
economic and social initiatives of  the IM captured the grievances of  
the Egyptians and, above all, tapped Islam to have had an unexpectedly 
19 J. Heyworth-Dunne, Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt (Washington: 
Publ. by the author, 1950), pp. 106–11.
20 Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt, p. 142.
21 Hasan al-Banna, Five Tracts of  Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), trans. by Charles 
Wendell (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1978), p. 11.
22 Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of  the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), p. 215.
23 Banna, Five Tracts of  Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), p. 17.
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powerful appeal. Hasan al-Banna did not set out to craft the IM as a 
mass-based political movement. Instead, he devoted much attention to 
education and to village welfare work in a method reminiscent of  Sufi 
sects understood by al-Banna as an educational movement for the “reform 
of  hearts and minds”.24
Hasan al-Banna called for “the purification of  Muslim societies 
through the return to the Qur’an and the Sunnah of  the Prophet as 
the main source for the establishment of  an Islamic system”.25 The 
organization was thus originally conceptualized as a modest religious 
association, with a limited but innovative social program. From its start, 
the IM established its own social welfare network, providing essential 
healthcare and other social services to the poor, particularly valuable 
during the worldwide economic downturn of  the 1930s.26 The IM also 
set about establishing an independent economic base for itself  and to this 
end, created enterprises in fields as diverse as weaving, transportation, 
and construction, and even quite progressively offered employees stock 
options in its companies.27 
Facilitated by a conviction that benevolent social activism formed 
an integral part of  Islam’s social ethos, such programs accounted for the 
dramatic rise of  the IM’s role as a key player in Egyptian politics. While 
political and other social organizations lost their vigor and cohesiveness 
largely because of  economic downturn, the IM established itself  as 
the fastest growing organization in post-independent Egypt. Between 
1928 and 1930, when the IM begun formally operating its programs in 
Isma’iliyya neighborhood, Hasan al-Banna had been successful in building 
a disciplined-community to represent “a model of  Islamic system”. The 
system constitutes voluntary organizations integrated within Islamic-
religious characters among their members. It is built upon the principles 
of  totality of  Islam which includes schools, social clubs, boy scouts, 
24 Sami Zubaida, “The Quest for the Islamic State”, in Islam, the People and the 
State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle (New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 47.
25 Mitchell, The Society of  the Muslim Brothers, p. 191.
26 Ishaq Musa Husayni, The Moslem Brethren: the Greatest of  Modern Islamic 
Movements (Westport: Hyperion Press, 1956), pp. 71–3.
27 Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, p. 154.
431Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2018 M/1439 H
Lineages of  Islamic Extremism in Egypt
newspapers, health clinics and mosques.28 
The IM called for the dismantling of  borrowed secular institutions 
of  government. But the IM’s struggle did not simply amount to the 
advocacy of  a return to an obsolete, outmoded way of  life. Rather, 
theirs was a more sophisticated prescription for remedying Egypt’s 
ills. It has been said that the IM was (and remains) “an effort to re-
institutionalize religious life for those whose commitment to the tradition 
and religion is still great, but who at the same time are already effectively 
touched by the forces of  Westernization”.29 Hasan al-Banna posited 
the reestablishment of  a “pure” Islam as the foundation for all social 
intercourse and a definitive cure for society’s afflictions. Only through 
the creation of  a society based on the total application of  Islam could 
Egypt (and, by extension, the Arab and Islamic worlds) emerge victorious 
from its unavoidable encounters with modernity.30 According to Hasan 
al-Banna, Egypt had to be purified of  the taint of  the British as well 
as the secularized political elite who steered Egypt into its political and 
economic decline.
Later in the late 1930s, when the conflicts between the IM and other 
political groups grew, Hasan al-Banna made explicit proposals intended as 
a clear formulation of  what he imagined as an Islamic state. He declared:
We want an “Islamic government” that will lead these people to the 
mosque and guide people through the mosque thereafter through guidance 
of  Islam. For these reasons, we do not recognize any governmental 
system which is not founded on the basis of  Islam or derived from it. 
We do not recognize these political parties, or these traditional forms 
which the infidels and the enemies of  Islam have forced us to rule by 
and practice. We will seek to revive the Islamic system of  rule with all its 
28 In 1940 it developed into 500 branches with around one million active 
members. In 1954, the IM has registered itself  as the largest organization with 2000 
branches and 2 million active cadres. 
29 Mohammad Amien Rais, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: Its Rise, 
Demise, and Resurgence”, Ph.D Dissertation (Chicago: The University of  Chicago, 
1981), p. 153.
30 See, William L. Cleveland, A History of  the Modern Middle East (Boulder, Colo: 
Westview Press, 1994), pp. 184–7. Hasan al-Banna cautioned his followers that as “the 
shari’a was originally formulated to meet a specific set of  historical circumstances. It 
was thus a product of  informed human reasoning which, through careful interpretation, 
would permit its adaptation to modernity”. 
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manifestation and form.31
Hasan al-Banna’s strong concern with the role of  state in public 
moral purity led the IM’s program to focus on how Quranic inspiration 
enters the daily life of  Muslims. Hasan al-Banna perceived a widespread 
flagging of  emotional commitment to Islam but expected a solution 
from the existing political elite. He specifically addressed this problem in 
the sermon “Naẓrāt fī iṣlāḥ al-Nafs” (Remarks on Self-reform), with its 
striking central image of  electricity. In his view, “if  the effect of  Qur’an is 
not the same in us as it was in our ancestors then we are like an electrician 
who has put insulation between himself  and the current so that he is 
not affected by it. Our task is to break down this insulation so that we 
can feel the Qur’an so that our hearts will be in communication with it 
and we will taste its sweetness”.32 For Hasan al-Banna, today Muslims 
were emotionally insulated from the Qur’an, but he did not connect this 
insulation with an institutional foundation.
In February 1949, Hasan al-Banna was assassinated. The 
assassination marked an important development of  the IM. At this early 
stage, the IM had no formal organization intended to be directly involved 
in politics, and their activities revolved around an education approach. The 
strong inclination to struggle for moral purity in increasingly secular and 
industrializing Egypt, has led the IM leadership to enter politics without 
being transformed into a political organization. Their basic message was 
that purist, religious characters of  political interest of  the IM’s leadership 
was shaped by the conditions of  20th century Egypt in which of  pro-long, 
unsolvable political crisis and socioeconomic downturn occurred. Such 
moments of  decision are crucial sites of  interaction between ideology 
and political context.
C. Nasser’s Revolution and State Violence
The prolonged and unresolved crisis in Egypt has shaped a 
situation in which the anti-British organizations, including the IM, 
begun to develop revolutionary ideas for political changes. Three 
31 Hasan al-Banna, Majmu`at rasa’il al-Imam al-shahid Hasan al-Banna (Beirut: 
Dar al-Da’wa, 1990), p. 32.
32 Hasan Al-Banna, “Naẓrāt fī iṣlāḥ al-Nafs”, in Tazkirat al Hasan Al-Banna 
(Cairo, 1956).
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organizations were operating at this revolutionary situation: the Ikhwan 
al-Muslimun, the Free Officers Movement, and –in less organized form– 
the Communists.33 The first two organizations were widely seen as the 
most capable of  bringing about real political change. Both harbored ill 
feelings toward the Egyptian regime and Britain, but differed in terms of  
their goals. The IM was a civilian organization that, until the early 1950s, 
remained the only mass-based opposition whose aim of  establishing an 
Islamic state was well known. The Free Officers was an organization put 
together by 200 dissident military officers following the 1948 Arab-Israeli 
war.34 Led by Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mohamad Najib and other middle 
rank officers, the Free Officers launched a bloodless coup on July 23rd, 
1952 against King Farouk. In hours the two centuries of  the monarchy 
had collapsed.
One of  the most significant challenges to the Free Officers after the 
coup came from the well-organized Ikhwan al-Muslimun. Crucial aspect 
of  the struggle between the two organizations involved differences on 
what form Egyptian society would take: Nasser’s plan was to restructure 
Egypt along socialist and ‘secular’ lines, while the IM emphasized a state 
based on the implementation of  shari’a in guiding the people.35 Recent 
account on the role of  the IM has revealed that the coup was in fact 
the result of  a well planned, or at least coordinated, operation between 
the IM leadership and Nasser’s Free Officers.36 These studies have also 
emphasized that it was the military factions of  the IM that firmly opted 
for working with Nasser to help launch the coup.37
33 Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt.
34 Joel Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement: Egypt’s Free Officers and the July Revolution 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 19.
35 It must be noted, Nasser’s ideology was initially not clear. His socialist and 
secular-leaning political system was adopted later when the conflict between Free 
Officers and the Ikhwan escalated.  
36 Omar Ashour, “Lions Tamed? An Inquiry into the Causes of  De-
Radicalization of  Armed Islamist Movements: The Case of  the Egyptian Islamic 
Group”, Middle East Journal, vol. 61, no. 4 (2007), pp. 596–625.
37 Ibid., pp. 88–90. King Farouk’s legitimacy following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war 
was very low, particularly between November 1951 and March 1952. This period was 
marked by riots and demonstrations in Cairo, Alexandria and Isma’iliyya. Riots against 
the King broke out in Cairo, eventually leaving a “greater part of  the city’s business 
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The absence of  dominant organization in the coup also means 
that, the Free Officers’ coup of  July 1952 was distinguished by its lack 
of  ideological content.38 The character of  the new military regime was 
thus shaped by the leadership’s pragmatic policy choices,39 particularly 
the desire to stay in power. The Free Officers were committed to several 
broad goals: achieving national independence from Britain, improving 
the country’s military preparedness, reforming the political system to 
stamp out corruption, and achieving a higher level of  social justice.40 
These goals were largely compatible with the short-term plans of  the 
IM, which included ending the British occupation, establishing a stable 
and clean political system, and narrowing the gap between the rich 
and the poor.41 But the political processes aimed at constitutional reform 
led to a series of  events that fed a relentless pattern of  power competition 
between the Free Officers and other revolutionaries, particularly the Ikhwan.
Open conflict between the Free Officers and the IM drew ever 
nearer. Nasser began to prepare to launch strikes against opposition 
forces. Although the Free Officers expressed their commitment to 
maintaining the 1923 Constitution, Nasser was in intense critics of  the 
Wafd, which he accused as having betrayed the national cause by approving 
of  the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal in 1936.42 This 
conviction caused the Free Officers to attack against the party system in 
1953. All parties were banned, their papers were closed, and their 
leaders were arrested and put on trial. Another decisive step taken by the 
Free Officers—one that was at odds with the liberal constitution—was 
land reform. This step was “the most decisive act” of  the Free Officers for 
reform, since it weakened the traditional landed elite and helped the regime 
district” in ruins, Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement, p. 27.
38 This means that, compared to other organizations, the Free Officers had no 
clear guidance for its platform. For detailed account, see Kirk J. Beattie, Egypt During 
the Nasser Years: Ideology, Politics, and Civil Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 54.
39 Ibid., p. 71.
40 Abd al-Azim Ramadan, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa-l-Tanzim al-Sirri (Cairo: 
Maktab Madbuli, 1982), pp. 127–30.
41 Ibid., p. 84.
42 Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, pp. 61–2. The Wafd also participated 
in the British-inspired war cabinet of  1942 that hurt the military, especially Nasser’s 
generation. 
435Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2018 M/1439 H
Lineages of  Islamic Extremism in Egypt
to reach out to the countryside.
Nasser then announced a three-year “transition period”, during 
which the military would rule under martial law. The Free Officers went 
on to transform their organization into the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC), and formalized their own power with a temporary 
constitution in February of  1953. The regime briefly tolerated some 
opposition in early 1954, but they took final crackdown in April. This 
latter move stripped all opposition leaders, and led to the arrest of  critical 
journalists, the dismissal of  university professors who opposed to the 
regime, and the closing of  university campuses. By August 1954, all key 
cabinet posts and control of  the national state apparatus were assigned 
to the military.43
It is within this environment of  a power transition that the Free 
Officers sought to resolve the issues surrounding the Islamic state 
advocated by the IM, and more importantly, the position of  the IM 
vis-a-vis the regime. The IM leadership decided not to participate in 
the Liberation Rally. Instead, they maintained their focus on effecting 
Islamic constitutional transformation for Egypt. As Hudaybi stated in 
October 1953, “we (the IM) demand that the stipulation of  the Qur’an 
in the Constitution be put into operation immediately. If  the goals of  
our Revolution are for Islamic cause, the IM will support this revolution 
and becomes the backbone of  the government”.44 With the new regime 
consistently rejecting the call for an Islamic constitution, the IM began 
to demonstrate its power through street demonstrations in the late 
1953. The Free Officers were deeply worried about the IM’s consistent 
opposition. Meanwhile, the IM had also begun to realize that the regime 
had no intention of  governing according to Islamic principles, and 
moreover seemed to be signaling that they would have only marginal 
power at best. Disillusion thus grew between the two groups. After a 
particularly unruly demonstration at Cairo University in January 1954, 
the Free Officers took the risky step of  dissolving the IM. The regime 
justified this by arguing that their Supreme Guide Hudaybi had attempted 
to put the regime under his tutelage and spread anti-regime propaganda 
43 Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement, pp. 134–6.
44 This statement appeared in the document, Free Officers, Revolutionary 
Command Council (1955), pp. 94–5. 
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within the armed forces.45
The long struggle for constitutional reform also ended in late 1954, 
with both the former liberal constitution and an Islamic constitution 
being ruled out as organizing frameworks for the new Egyptian state. 
The decision to jettison the Islamic option was undoubtedly influenced 
by Nasser’s realization that organizing the state according to Islamic 
principles would have dramatically strengthened the IM, at a time when 
it was a serious contender for power. The IM’s unwavering struggle 
for an Islamic state organized according to shari’a law caused them to 
consistently reject compromise on this issue, for instance by acceding to 
some sort of  power sharing arrangement.
D. Transitions to Islamic Radical Politics
In 1964, the stabilization of  Nasser’s political order was finally 
achieved through the promulgation of  a new constitution. This was 
the successor to the June 23rd, 1956 constitution, which had guided 
Egyptians through the initial post-monarchy period.46 For the Free 
Officers, this 1964 Constitution outlined “the legitimating principles 
for the Revolution”.47 And while its content was overly influenced by 
the interest of  the Free Officers in securing power, it also represented 
a new formulation of  the 1923 Constitution, one that provided for 
a greater concentration of  power in the office of  the president, and 
which as a result enabled Nasser to establish a highly centralized regime 
that controlled Egypt’s politics and society. Throughout the 1960s, the 
core institutions of  the new state remained the armed forces, the newly 
expanded mukhabarat (state security services), and a single organization, 
the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), through which all public participation 
45 Mitchell, The Society of  the Muslim Brothers, p. 281; Harris, Nationalism and 
Revolution in Egypt.
46 The 1964 Constitution marked the final outcome of  the ideological battle that 
had raged since 1952. In 1956 Egypt held a referendum to approve the “temporary” 
national constitution, followed by the declaration of  the National Charter in 1962 as 
the ideological basis for the Revolution. The 1964 Constitution can be regarded as the 
formalization of  the Charter. On the development of  Egypt’s constitution, see also 
Rutherford, Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and Democracy in the Arab World.
47 Ibid., p. 51.
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was channeled.48 
The wave of  persecution of  the IM began in late 1954, following 
the assassination attempt on Nasser. Shortly after the incident, the IM 
was rounded up in what appeared to be a well-planned action. Thousands 
were sent to prison with or without trial, and a number of  leading figures 
were sentenced to death by military tribunals, while many others managed 
to leave Egypt for Jordan, Syria, countries in the Gulf, and most notably, 
Saudi Arabia.49 For the IM members who remained in Egypt, the years 
between 1955 and 1962 were characterized by “internal struggles for 
organizational survival”50 in the form of  underground activism, partly 
because of  the state’s close surveillance of  its activities and because of  
the execution or imprisonment of  its leading figures.
This leadership gap in the IM was almost entirely the result of  
imprisonment, torture, and isolation carried out by Nasser’s persecution 
of  the group. It is not surprising that a clear ideology and set of  guidelines 
for relations with the new state were not available. Beginning in 1958, 
there were efforts amongst the imprisoned members of  the IM to address 
the leadership vacuum by making Sayyid Qutb a leading figure able to 
dispense spiritual advice. These efforts were relatively successful, and 
thus the early 1960s became a turning point within the IM’s trajectory, 
in which signs of  revival began to replace disillusionment.51 There are 
three major indicators of  this change: first, during this period, prisoners 
started to exchange and discuss ideas, especially related to opposition 
strategies. Second, a communications network was built up, linking 
prisoners, and notably Qutb, to members and leaders on the outside. 
Third, Nasser relaxed his tight grip on the IM and released members 
with shorter prison sentences.52
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) is perhaps the most important theorist of  
48 Between 1957 and 1960 the Free Officers began a gradual incorporation of  
its members, networks and clients to be transferred into the state. This network helped 
them to run the government. See, Gordon, Nasser’s Blessed Movement, pp. 34–6.
49 Rais, “The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt”, pp. 181–3.
50 Barbara Zollner, “Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle 
during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Persecution, 1954 to 1971”, International Journal of  Middle 
East Studies, vol. 39, no. 3 (2007), p. 412.
51 Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, p. 171.
52 Ibid., pp. 121–6.
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contemporary radical Muslim politics. But his relationship with the IM, 
was a complex one. Qutb was a moderately liberal-leaning intellectual 
during the 1940s. A literary critic by training, he returned to Egypt from 
a year-long stay in the United States as a committed Islamist activist. 
His interest in joining the IM grew in the early 1950s, when he regularly 
contributed to their publications, including al-Da’wah (The Call) and al-
Muslimun (the Muslims). In those publications, he harshly criticized the 
British occupation of  Egypt, even calling for Muslims to form Kata’ib 
al-Fida’ (Sacrifice Battalions) to fight against the British. Beginning in 
1951, he was elected as the Head of  the Information Department. By the 
time of  the 1952 Coup, Qutb was a member of  the Guidance Bureau.53
Qutb was among the IM leaders arrested in the first wave of  
persecution in 1954. He spent only eight months in prison until he 
was transferred to the Liman al-Turra prison hospital in 1956 due to ill 
health. It was in this prison hospital that Qutb was able to work on a 
number of  projects. He continued his voluminous Qur’an commentary 
Fi Zilal al-Qur’an (Under the Shade of  the Qur’an), revised his renowned 
book al-Adalat al-Ijtima’i fi al-Islam (Social Justice in Islam), and wrote 
short manuscripts.54 Qutb’s most important work, Ma’alim fi al-Tariq 
(Milestones), although published after his release, was most probably 
written during these prison years.55 The prominence of  Qutb’s various 
works put him in a position of  intellectual leadership within the 
organization, and made him central to Egypt’s Islamic ideological changes 
in the crucial years of  Nasser’s persecutions.
This move toward Islamist ideological changes was facilitated 
by prisoner networks, which played a crucial role in elaborating and 
disseminating Qutb’s ideas. Qutb was able to communicate and exchange 
thoughts with other prisoners during his hospitalization in the Liman 
53 Ramadan, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn wa-l-Tanzim al-Sirri, p. 76. This brief  biography 
was extracted from Adnan Musallam, From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundation 
of  Radical Islamism (Westport: Praeger, 2005). See also, Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb”, pp. 67–98; 
Muhammad Hafiz Diyab, Sayyid Qutb: Al-Khitab wa-l-Idiyulujiyya (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafa 
al-Jadida, 1987), pp. 103–7.
54 William E. Shepard, “Islam as a ‘system’ in the later writings of  Sayyid Qutb”, 
Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 25, no. 1 (1989), pp. 213–35.
55 Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley: 
University of  California Press, 1989), p. 50.
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Tura prison.56 This enabled the prisoners to discuss and learn from 
Qutb’s ideas, and upon their return to their various “home” prisons, 
they further engaged with the ideas. Hudaybi, who held the de jure 
leadership of  the IM, definitely knew of  these activities.57 It is quite 
clear that by 1958, Qutb’s ideas had become the central discourse among 
the prisoners, which helped infuse a new spirit within the organization. 
Moreover, Qutb’s ideas were also discussed outside the prison, through 
the members who regularly visited Qutb in prison and spread his ideas 
amongst those outside prison.58 
This group, named in court as “Nizam 1965” (Organization 1965), 
was largely composed of  former prisoners, some of  whom had been 
incarcerated in the prison of  Qanatir, as well as a large number of  IM 
who had escaped the 1954 arrests.59 The new group was in close contact 
with Qutb, who acted as their spiritual guide.60 It soon became the most 
important forum for the new generation in the IM to disseminate and 
expand Qutb’s ideas about the strategy for Islamist opposition. The 
Nizam 1965 also became the launch pad for forms of  underground 
activities that echoed the purist organizational strategy introduced by 
Hasan al-Banna.61 Moreover, the group saw itself  as the vanguard of  
Islamist activism called for by Qutb. As Haddad points out, “a member 
(of  this group) needs to pass through several challenging stages of  study, 
preaching, and persecution in order to reach their goal of  establishing 
56 Ibid., p. 28.
57 Between 1950 and 1960, the younger members at Qanatir prison were 
particularly inspired by Qutb’s ideas. They began to preach the concept of  takfir to 
other Muslims and government.
58 Zaynab Al-Ghazali, leader of  al-Sayyidāt al-Muslimāt (the Muslim Sisterhood), 
provided a detailed account of  the IM’s efforts to circumvent the leadership gap that 
eventually led to the close association with Qutb’s ideas. She mentioned that a number 
of  the Brothers and Sisters visited Qutb and other prisoners and discussed many 
issues with them. Please see Zaynab Al-Ghazali, Ayyām min Ḥayātī, (Cairo: al-Matba’a 
al-Adabiyya, 1987), pp. 57–60.
59 Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, p. 92.
60 Sayyid Quṭb, Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis 
of  Social Justice in Islam, trans. by William E. Shepard (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. 36.
61 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution Fundamentalism in the Arab World, 2nd 
edition (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1995).
440 Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2018 M/1439 H
Ali Munhanif  & M. Dahlan
a just Islamic society”.62
Arguably, the organizational development of  the IM and the role of  
Qutb in that development were not a secret to the official Supreme Guide, 
Hudaybi.63 Moreover, it seems that Hudaybi was aware of  the ideological 
foundation of  Nizam 1965, and made no effort to disband the group or 
to object to Qutb’s theories. The underlying reason for Hudaybi’s decision 
was likely related to the fact that while the IM experienced very tight 
political constraints under Nasser’s regime, the activities of  Nizam 1965 
and the expansion of  Qutb’s ideas became viable means for preventing 
the IM from entering into a total decline. It is only in the late 1960s, 
when Nizam 1965 organized an armed insurrection against the regime, 
that Hudaybi began to take steps to denounce radical politics. 
More accommodating principles regarding the Islamic state 
alternative were then adopted by Hudaybi’s faction.64 One of  the most 
important efforts in this de-radicalizing initiative was the publication of  
a book entitled Du’at la Qudhat (Preachers, Not Judges), which went on 
to underpin the IM’s long-term moderation. This marked the historic 
rupture within Egyptian Islamism that led to the official leadership 
distancing itself  from the radicals. The problem is that, Nasser’s to the 
group of  Nizam 1965 was swift and brutal. The group was brought to 
court, with members and collaborators accused of  planning to overthrow 
the state system. At the same time, another massive purge of  Islamist 
activists and the IM was launched. This wave of  persecution resulted in 
the execution of  six leaders of  the IM, including Sayyid Qutb, in mid-
1966, as well as the imprisonment and torture of  thousands of  rank and 
file members.65
The fact that the group subscribed to an extreme ideology and 
had a militant method for an Islamic state was undeniable. For Nizam 
62 Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, p. 92.
63 Zollner, “Prison Talk”, pp. 411–33.
64 Ibid.
65 Beattie, Egypt During the Nasser Years, p. 79. According to the IM’s estimates, 
the number of  people detained by Nasser in 1965 reached 20,000, of  whom around 
1,000 were brought before a military tribunal. It must be mentioned that it is unlikely that 
Nizam 1965 had concrete plans for terrorist activities. This issue is that, after Nasser’s 
power consolidation in the 1960s, he still perceived IM as a threat to his power. See, 
Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, p. 183.
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1965, the absolute character of  state power was the prime target of  
criticism, while the state system under Nasser represented the epitome 
of  un-Islamic conduct. Thus although Qutb’s theories did not explicitly 
mention about Nasser and his regime, he charged ‘secular regime’ with 
the ultimate crime of  apostasy. Furthermore, Qutb’s total rejection of  
the existing political system implied that the use of  violence in order to 
bring about an Islamic revolution was legitimate. Qutb’s Ma’alim fi al-Tariq 
contained an ideological commitment that said that “…violent struggle 
for an Islamic state is legitimate”,66 and that the Nizam constitutes a 
model for Islamic radical politics in Egypt. 
Qutb’s ideas on society, politics and governance are firmly grounded 
in extreme interpretation of  Islam, and that they are related to Hasan al-
Banna’s own ideas.67 The two works that are primarily responsible for the 
perception of  Qutb as a radical Islamist thinker are Under the Shade and 
Milestones, which represent a concrete elaboration of  Hasan al-Banna’s 
strategy and program for an Islamic state through the purification of  
society. But while Hasan al-Banna was the product of  the 19th century 
“ancient regime” and the British colonial state, Qutb focused far more 
on Nasser’s nationalist state. Qutb’s understandings of  community and 
agency were conditioned by the experience of  witnessing a powerful, 
absolutist and secular state “… intrude into society as the colonial regime 
had never been capable of  doing”. Qutb evoked evil as an active and 
insidious force identified as taghut, by which he meant “deception that 
cannot endure the mere existence of  truth … for even if  truth wished 
to live in isolation from deception – leaving victory to the decision of  
God – deception cannot accept this situation”.68
Building upon these religious themes, Qutb sought to describe 
human political power by conflating the words: taghut and tughyan. Tughyan 
has to do with overstepping boundaries (including “going beyond 
disbelief ”), whereas taghut is associated with “that which is worshipped 
66 Ibid., p. 312.
67 For a comparative analysis of  Qutb’s and al-Banna’s thought, see Olivier 
Carre, “From Banna to Qutb and ‘Qutbism’: The Radicalization of  Fundamentalist 
Thought under Three Regimes”, in Egypt from Monarchy to Republic: A Reassessment of  
Revolution and Change, ed. by Shimon Shamir (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 201–10. 
68 Sayyid Qutb, al-`Adala al-Ijtima` iyya fi al-Islam (Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1974).
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other than God”.69 Here the notion of  a modern Pharaoh that emerged 
during the Islam-liberal debate in the 1920s reappeared as a fundamental 
theme in Qutb’s interpretation of  the penetration of  Nasser’s regime 
into Egyptian society. Qutb argued that the arbitrary power of  the state 
symbolized by Pharaoh could be conflated with Nasser’s absolutist 
regime. Underlying Qutb’s ideas was a conviction that the ordering of  
human affairs is the exclusive domain of  God, and that “all other forms 
of  human governance, as the source of  authority and commands, are 
therefore equal to shirk (polytheism)”.70
Effectively, Qutb drew upon Hasan al-Banna’s ideas to envisage a 
far more intolerant, sophisticated and exclusive Islamic state. There are 
three main themes within Qutb’s ideas that were influential in shaping the 
organizational imperatives of  radical Islamist groups in the 1970s. The 
first is the concept of  jāhiliyya, which refers to the immoral, polytheist 
society of  pre-Islamic Arabia, and which Qutb interpreted to also describe 
a state of  being. According to Qutb, any individual, group or society that 
did not live according to Islam based on the shari’a was living in jāhiliyya. 
This included those citizens of  Muslim countries who were not living 
according to shari’a’s tenets. Qutb argued that jāhiliyya was “a destructive 
and corruptive force intent on eradicating the true Islamic path”.71
Second, Qutb characterized the world as being polarized into 
dar al-harb (house of  war), which was every part of  the world that was 
non-Islamic, and dar al-Islam (house of  Islam), which was the Islamic 
world. He argued that the dar al-harb was to be fought against and 
destroyed, and then replaced with a Muslim state based on the shari’a. 
In his notions of  al-jāhiliyya and dar al-harb, Qutb was highlighting the 
universalism of  Islam, which made it well-equipped to take over all other 
societies. Echoing Hasan al-Banna’s vision, Qutb proclaimed Islam to 
be a complete system, and argued that the main purpose and message of  
the Qur’an was “political and social, not just spiritual”.72 This political 
69 Ibid., p. 137.
70 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, p. 87.
71 Sayyid Qutb, Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1979), p. 23.
72 Eric Davis, “Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt”, 
in From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, ed. by Said Amir Arjomand (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 1984), p. 153.
443Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2018 M/1439 H
Lineages of  Islamic Extremism in Egypt
order would liberate humanity from the yoke of  a secular system of  state. 
Kepel73 noted, Qutb’s polarization of  the world into two systems made 
his “ideologies appealing, since they provided guidelines for analyzing 
the (Nasser’s) declining regime.” 
The third main theme in Qutb’s ideas was his interpretation of  
al-Banna’s concept of  jihād to constitute a “revolt against (unbelieving) 
rulers”.74 Making a point that still resonates today with the radical 
Islamists, Qutb stated in the mid-1960s: 
“…we are the umma of  Believers, living within a jāhili society. Nothing 
relates us to state or to society and we owe no allegiance to either. As a 
community of  believers we should see ourselves in a state of  war with 
the state and society. The territory we dwell in is dar al-harb”75
Dissatisfied with the existing Islamist movement, Qutb asserted 
that social revolution “…provided the means to eradicate this state of  
jāhiliyya and to create the Islamic state mandated by the shari’a”. Qutb 
conceptualized the need for revolution in terms of  submission to the 
oneness of  God (tawhid). He argued that Islam inherently requires 
the submission to this oneness, which in turn requires the “positive 
submission to God and negative revolt against submitting to other 
authority being they are concrete, metaphysical, or political”.
Arguably, the seeds of  revolution would only come about at a 
suitable juncture: “Qutb impressed upon them (Islamists seeking his 
approval for anti-state violence) the need for long-term educational 
endeavors to form cadres and militants while waiting for the opportune 
moment to strike”. The importance of  jihād and the need to eradicate 
jāhiliyya societies brought Qutb to consider the necessity of  creating 
“a distinct community of  believers” that would take the lead in the 
destruction of  the jāhiliyya. His worldview thus depicted the world as in 
a state of  perennial conflict between those of  the “party of  God” and 
those of  the jāhiliyya societies. 
These radical ideas, however, were not translated into organizational 
imperatives until the structural conditions necessary for their emergence 
appeared in the form of  Nizam 1965. Nasser’s death in 1971 and the 
73 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, p. 153.
74 Sayyid Qutb, Milestones (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1993), p. 91.
75 Qutb, Milestones, p. 98.
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subsequent political changes under his successor, Anwar Sadat, provided a 
new opportunity for the continued growth of  these radical alternatives. In 
the 1970s, as Eric Davis76 remarked, “political activism of  Islam became 
increasingly bifurcated and social and economic disorder pressures the 
activism into new forms of  Islamist movements, which are thoroughly 
divorced (from the IM)”. Egypt’s defeat in the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 
propelled new patterns of  state-Islam relations in which Qutb’s extreme 
and violence ideas found fertile ground for taking revolutionary solutions 
for an Islamic state.
E. The Rise of  Jamāʻah al-Islāmīyah and Tanzim al-Jihad
As we have mentioned earlier, it is the role of  institutions created 
by Nasser’s regime that facilitated the changing character of  mobilization 
for Islamic state, from a moderate to extreme interpretation of  Islam. 
One may see that, after the Arab defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, 
one of  the most crucial aspects of  Egypt’s Islamic turn was the effort 
to Islamize university students. This effort was aimed at fanning the 
increasing religious awareness among the youth. While in the early years 
of  Sadat’s presidency the Nasserist-leftist dominated the Egyptian student 
movements, in 1972 new “families” (usrah) and “associations” (jama’a) 
were beginning to surface for the first time. These groups had a religious 
character, and had their roots in “religious study clubs” on university 
campuses.77 They soon began to sponsor Islamic education programs, 
such as miscellaneous activities to producing publications, putting on 
summer camps, and organizing journeys to Mecca.78 
Sadat’s effort to mobilize Islam on university campuses was 
beginning to bear fruit by the time the 1973 war was launched. As Kepel79 
has pointed out, “university life became more religious…largely with 
encouragement from the new (Sadat’s) regime.” As a result of  the state’s 
continuing support, Islamist groups varied and expanded the scope of  
76 Davis, “Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt”, 
p. 153.
77 Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, p. 607.
78 Kepel notes that activities such as summer camps were generously sponsored 
and funded by the state. See, Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, pp. 191–2.
79 Ibid., p. 25.
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their activities to include more political ones. Again according to Kepel,80 
these religious “families” in Egypt’s universities were the sites where the 
young Islamist sympathizers and activists that later became the “Jamāʻah 
al-Islāmīyah” (Islamic Group, GI) first came together. They were the 
breeding ground for the cadres of  the future Islamist groups. 
In the mid-1970s, a more systematic and centralized strategy for 
encouraging Islamist student groups was initiated by their leaders, most 
notably ‘Abd al-Mun‘im, Abul Futuh, ‘Issam al-Aryan, Abul ‘ila al-Madi 
(Cairo, Alexandria and al-Minya), Nāgiḥ Ibrāhīm and Karam Zuhdi (Asyut 
University).81 This centralization was made possible by national student 
movements that came together around their shared support for the 1973 
war.82 These groups of  Islamist students were distinguished from the IM, 
and eventually formed a new organization that called itself  “Jamāʻah al-
Islāmīyah”. But at this time, each university group remained autonomous 
in terms of  its activities, with no single ideology or clear platform being 
embraced by them all. What was obvious was their ultimate goal: al-da‘wa 
(proselytizing) and al-’amr bil ma‘ruf  wal nahyi ‘an al-munkar (ordering 
virtue and preventing vice). They were thus “the nearest approach to a 
youth movement with a religious character”.83 Egypt’s university campuses 
were gradually transformed during the 1970s by the increasing dominance 
of  Islamist students, to the point that they came to be almost “governed” 
by young Muslim activists. These students worked to implement changes 
in the universities, in the curriculum taught, as well as by encouraging 
their fellow students to participate in Islamic activities, by halting lectures 
and classes during prayer times, by segregating the sexes in classrooms, 
80 Ibid., p. 137.
81 Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, p. 606.
82 Nāgiḥ Ibrāhīm, Mīthāq al-ʻamal al-Islāmī (Egypt, 1984), p. 17.
83 Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomy of  Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: 
Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings”, International Journal of  Middle East 
Studies, vol. 12, no. 4 (1980), pp. 423–53; Ibrāhīm, Mīthāq al-ʻamal al-Islāmī, p. 64. In the 
first national congress in 1974, the leading representatives from the universities agreed 
to form a defined structure for the Islamist student groups. Each university had a shura 
(consultative) council and an emir (leader). There was also a national emir al-umara’. 
Since the students were coming from a variety of  political convictions and ideologies, 
each university leadership operated in an autonomous manner. Interview with Abu ‘ila 
al-Madi, Cairo, December 10, 2015.
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and by prohibiting concerts, art performances and theatrical productions. 
Mohammad Haykal, described this ‘sea change’ in the environment at 
universities during the 1970s:
“Knowing they had the support of  higher (governmental) authority, the 
Islamic students began to behave as if  it was they who were running 
the universities. They decided what subjects were suitable to be taught, 
forcibly preventing, for instance, lectures to be given on Darwinism … 
it was clear that the Islamist students were not simply tolerated by the 
authorities but actively encouraged by them.”84
By the late 1970s, such religious mobilization began to pay off: 
Egypt’s students were markedly less interested in participating in the 
activities and demonstrations organized by the leftist student associations. 
An important phase for political Islam under Sadat was when Islamist 
groups began confronting leftist activists within the universities in the 
name of  “protecting Islam”.85 As the leftists withered and Sadat’s support 
for Islamist students continued, the Jamāʻah al-Islāmīyah gained strong 
footholds in almost all of  Egypt’s universities.
Yet its rapid success and lack of  a clearly formulated vision for 
society meant that while Jama’at was able to intensify its activism, it 
simultaneously became an ill-defined web of  activists within a stretched 
organizational body that lacked clear direction for change. This was 
reflected after the mid-1970s, when the Jamāʻah al-Islāmīyah activities 
rapidly moved forward as regards promoting its political agenda outside 
university campuses. It began to mobilize its members, as well as the 
religiously inclined townspeople, against what it called “rampant evil 
behaviors”.86 Sporadic violence began to occur on university campuses, 
as well as in the neighborhoods around them. Between 1977 and 1979, 
after its leaders’ success in winning seats on the Executive Council of  the 
National Students Union,87 the Jamāʻah al-Islāmīyah began a campaign 
84 Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Autumn of  Fury: The Assassination of  Sadat 
(New York: Random House, 1983), p. 133.
85 Ibid., p. 138; Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, pp. 607–8.
86 Hamied N. Ansari, “The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics”, International 
Journal of  Middle East Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (1984), pp. 123–44.
87 Three leaders of  the Jama’at who won seats in the National Student Union 
were Tal’at Qasim, Abu ‘ila al-Madhi, and Abdulghani Taha. Interview with al-Madhi, 
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in Cairo University that saw them asserting “…we knew that religion is 
not only to conduct da’wa, but is also the establishment of  the Islamic 
state…to achieve (such a goal), it is an essential precondition that we 
work to eradicate those practices of  jāhiliyya”.88 Simultaneously, similar 
activities were undertaken on other university campuses, including Asyut 
University.89
The relative ease with which the Jama’at activists tapped the use 
of  violence in confronting the leftist organizations and in spreading 
their religious activism underlined the strong support that they were 
receiving from the regime. At the same time, the nature and extent of  
their activities ultimately helped them to guarantee themselves a greater 
chance of  expanding their influence and growth. For instance, in Asyut, 
one of  the organization’s strongholds in Egypt’s southern province, the 
Jama’at leaders found themselves with sufficient popular legitimacy to 
carry out the da’wa and to enforce certain Islamic behaviors. Yet it bears 
noting that their desire to do so was also a strong indication that they had 
begun to adopt a more confrontational and militant strategy. That strategy 
later turned out to be directed not only against leftists and Nasserists, as 
well as against Christian Copts, but also against the state authority itself. 
As the uncontrolled religious activism pursued by the Jama’at 
intensified, it became apparent that clear intellectual guidance was required 
so as to transform their strength into concrete political achievements. In 
1977, a number of  the Jama’at leaders, particularly from Cairo, Alexandria 
and the Nile Delta, joined the IM, thereby strengthening the politically 
moderate wing of  Egyptian Islamists. Some other leaders, who were 
mainly from Asyut, were more inclined to join the jihadist groups that 
had begun to emerge in 1974. These groups were imprisoned-members 
of  Nizam 1965. Then in 1979, a Cairo-Jamāʻah leader, Karam Zuhdi, 
as well as various Asyut-leaders, met Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Farag, 
a jihadist leader released from prison in 1978. The meeting resulted in 
an agreement to unite and to coordinate their efforts to form a united 
jihadist organization, the Jama’at Islamiya (JI).90 The alliance between 
Cairo, 10 December, 2007.
88 Ansari, “The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics”, p. 131.
89 Ibid., p. 137.
90  Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, p. 608.
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the Islamist-students and a prominent leader of  the Nizam 1965 spurred 
further radicalization of  Islam in which revolutionary jihad came to 
increasingly define the contours of  the mobilization for an Islamic state.
Jihadist leaders had begun to operate and recruit their cadres 
soon after their release. Between 1972 and 1974, approximately 20 small 
factions of  jihadist groups operated in Cairo and Asyut, but only three 
of  these later became major organizations.91 The first of  these is the 
Technical Military Academy Group (al-Fanniya al-Askariya).92 This group 
attempted to seize the Military Academy in Asyut in 1974, in order to 
launch a coup during Sadat’s speech in the Academy. Their goal was to 
seize weapons and then assassinate the President. Although their attempt 
failed,93 it was the first jihadist group that publicly declared Egypt’s 
need for an Islamic revolutionary transformation. This group was led 
by Salih Sirriya, a member of  Nizam 1965 who believed that jihad was 
a tool capable of  changing a political system that was deemed jāhiliyya 
and ‘infidel’.
In a document entitled Epistle of  Faith (Risalat al-Iman), Salih Sirriya 
asserted that “all of  the current Islamic regimes are infidel and jāhiliyya 
regimes”.94 Sirriya regarded the use of  violence as a legitimate way to 
change “the dominant rule”, since doing so was justified in Islamic 
jurisprudence, in order to anesthetize and excommunicate regimes. The 
document also stated that, “the House of  Islam (dar al-Islam) is the one 
in which the word of  God is the uppermost…and rule (government) is 
conducted according to the Quran…the House of  Kuffar (non-believers) 
is one in which the word of  non-belief  is the highest and is not ruled by 
the Quran.” Consequently, the only way to change from “infidel” rule is 
through “jihād”. What this group meant by jihad is “…a way to change 
91 Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution Fundamentalism in the Arab World; Ashour, 
“Lions Tamed?”, p. 608.
92 This organization was known by several names. Sometimes, they referred 
to themselves as the Islamic Liberation Organization (since its foundation was closely 
related to Jordan’s Hizb al-Tahrir). Some others called them Muhammad’s Youth 
(Shabab Muhammad). See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Egypt’s Islamic Militants”, MERIP 
Reports, no. 103 (1982), pp. 5–15. 
93 The leader of  the group, Salih Siriyya, was executed after the failed coup, 
and the other members of  the group were imprisoned.
94 Ansari, “The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics”, p. 191.
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governments and to establish the Islamic state, which is a compulsory 
duty of  every Muslim.”
The second group is The Society of  Repudiation and Emigration 
(Jama’at al-Takfir wa al-Hijra). This group’s name points toward its 
radical message of  “repudiating those institutions and persons deemed 
unbelievers”, and the need for “withdrawal from jāhiliyya society”.95 The 
ideology of  this organization built upon the model of  the Prophet 
Muhammad’s Hijra from Mecca to Medina to establish a true Islamic 
order. The group was established by Shukri Mustafa, shortly after his 
release from prison in 1970, though the initial members consisted of  
people he had approached and recruited during his six years in prison. 
The group’s ideology did not differentiate between the state and society, 
since as Mustafa wrote in his memoir, both society and the state are jāhiliy 
institutions that must be “purified”.96
It is because of  this lack of  differentiation that the members of  
Takfir wa la-Hijra believed that they must maintain their distance from 
state and society, and indeed should adopt a negative and violent attitude 
toward them. Mustafa, for instance, adopted Hijra (immigration) and 
isolation as disciplinary techniques and a necessary strategic step towards 
the ultimate goal, i.e., the Islamic state. Consequently, the group required 
its members to isolate (uzla) themselves from government institutions 
and to completely ostracize society and its members. They also rejected 
compulsory military service and employment in government departments 
and institutions.97
As part of  a disciplinary method for the organization, Mustafa 
forbade his members from praying in mosques constructed and 
sponsored by the state. This was because according to Takfir wa al-Hijra, 
the basic character of  the state’s reality was jāhiliyya, and this character 
would infect all of  its activities. As such, the only way to escape such an 
infidel situation was to join the Jama’at. Between his release in 1971 and 
his execution in 1977, Mustafa succeeded in recruiting approximately 
2,000 members to Jama’at al-Takfir in Asyut 
The third jihadist group that came out of  prison is Jihad 
95 Ibrahim, “Anatomy of  Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups”, p. 96.
96 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt.
97 Ansari, “The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics”, pp. 123–44.
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Organization of  Egypt (Tanzim al-Jihad al-Misr). Muhammad ‘Abdul Salam 
Farag established this group in Cairo in 1979. Farag’s group began to form 
after Nasser’s wave of  imprisonment, and expanded in the mid-1970s 
through the efforts of  masterful recruiters such as Ayman al-Zawahiri, 
Hani al-Siba’i, Anwar Ukasha, and Muhammad Qutb.98 Farag was the 
author of  al-Fariyḍa al-Ghā’iba (the Neglected Duty), an elaborate book on 
the strategy of  Sayyid Qutb that espoused jihad and violence as legitimate 
paths toward an Islamic state. This book became the members’ intellectual 
and ideological frame of  reference for executing the group’s military and 
political operations. Farag argued that the duty of  jihād — understood 
purely as armed struggle — was a duty that had been neglected by the 
Muslim faithful. He argued that:
“Despite its crucial importance for the future of  our Faith, the jihad 
has been neglected, maybe even ignored, by men of  religion of  our 
age. They know however, that jihad is the only way to reestablish and 
re-enhance the power and glory of  Islam, which every true believer 
desires wholeheartedly. There is no doubt the idols upon earth will not 
be destroyed but by the sword—and thus establish the Islamic state and 
restore the caliphate. This is the command of  God and each and every 
Muslim should, hence, do his utmost to accomplish this precept, having 
recourse to force if  necessary.”99
Like Qutb, Farag advocated the replacement of  the Egyptian 
regime with a caliphate, that is, a community of  believers governed by 
the precepts of  Islam and led by a religious leader (Caliph). To Farag, 
jihad represented a moral and religious imperative incumbent upon every 
Muslim. He thus specifically called for violence within the context of  
revolution, arguing that only by armed struggle could an Islamic state 
ever be realized. 
F. The Abortive Jihadist-Revolution in 1981
Members of  Nizam 1965 were serious students of  Sayyid Qutb. For 
instance, Farag based his theory of  jihadist revolution on Qutb’s view that 
98 Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, p. 111.
99 See, Muhammad ` Abdul Salam Farag, “The Neglected Duty”, in The Neglected 
Duty: The Creed of  Sadat’s Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East, ed. by Johannes 
J.G. Jansen (New York: Macmillan, 1986), p. 172.
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there is a “need to build a small, militant number of  believers that link 
(them) with broader Muslim society and mobilize the society’s support 
for (an) Islamic state (dar al-Islam)”.100 But in al-Fariyḍa al-Ghā’iba, Farag 
elaborated Qutb’s theory, saying that jihad should begin with a careful 
social, political, and economic analysis of  society. He argued that such 
an analysis is necessary for Islamists to “…decide upon and select the 
most appropriate and most effective method for change”,101 such as the 
shape and scale of  the Islamic revolution, the forms of  violence and the 
tactics to be used, and the level of  mobilization. Farag further underlined 
the “imperativeness of  establishing a secret (purified) society (jama’at)” 
responsible for penetrating the security forces, the army, collecting 
intelligence information, and recruiting sympathetic military personnel 
and officers into the organization, thus facilitating the achievement of  a 
total Islamic revolution.102
In the late 1970s, inspired by Farag’s vision and emboldened by the 
increasing number of  jihadists, leaders of  al-Jihad shifted their focus to 
the practical and organizational aspects of  their plan to seize control of  
the jahily state and to establish an Islamic one. Consequently, a middle 
ranking military officer who had served in the State Security Intelligence 
(SSI), Abbud al-Zumar, was joined al-Jihad in 1978.103 Al-Zumar quickly 
took on a major role in planning and strategy, while the military leaders 
of  al-Jihad, Esam al-Qamari, concentrated on the military training. 
The plans were outlined in a document entitled Pillars of  Continuity, 
which details major strategies that the Islamists deemed essential for 
achieving the Islamic Revolution.104 An in depth description of  these 
strategies was provided in a document entitled The Stages of  Islamic 
Movement Development. The document states that “the plan depended on 
constructing an organizational structure that is capable, by providing 
100 Qutb, Ma’alim fi al-Tariq, p. 79.
101 Farag, “The Neglected Duty”, p. 234.
102 Ibid., p. 236.
103 Abbud al-Zumar was a highly ranked officer in the Egyptian Army. He had 
a long career, military training, and extensive experience in the Army Intelligence since 
the October War of  1973. This background contributed to the development of  al-Jihad 
organization and its military strategy. 
104 Abbud al-Zumar, The Method of  the Islamic Jihad Group (unpublished, 1986), 
pp. 5–17.
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man-power and supplies, of  seizing power and completely controlling 
the vital state institutions and command centers on which the regime 
relies to rule the country, thereby paralyzing its ability to counter the 
Islamic move”.105 To protect their leaders, the plan aimed at “preventing 
the regime from taking certain measures or actions to confront Islamists, 
such as ambushing, assassinating, and arresting their influential officials 
and figures.” Furthermore, according to the plan, the organization should 
“disable the communications and transportation lines and deter the enemy 
reserve forces from participating in the battle.”
The document also emphasized the urgent task of  “preparing 
Islamist actors to be capable of  mobilizing the masses and inciting and 
goading them into participating in the revolution to demonstrate public 
support and hence deter foreign intervention…with the necessity of  
restraining all foreign agents working in the country”.106 Although the role 
of  the masses was not made completely clear in the plan, it is obvious 
that the strategy depended heavily on the tactics and choices of  the 
organization’s military leaders, who were at that time enlisted in the army.
The original plan for revolution, as designed by Abbud al-Zumar, 
required a three-year period of  preparation before undertaking any 
action. But a series of  unexpected events prompted a strategic change 
in the jihadists’ plan. The first of  these took place a few months after 
the plan had gained an approving fatwa from Sheikh Mohammad Omar 
Abdulrahman, when the authorities detected whispers about the planned 
operation. Sadat’s response was to arrest thousands of  members of  the 
political opposition in September 1981, especially the IM and leaders 
of  the Jamāʻah al-Islāmīyah. The latter group included nine leaders of  
jihadist organizations and members of  its Shura Council.107 
Another significant event that affected the plotters was the arrest 
of  group member Nabeel al-Maghribi while attempting to buy weapons 
from a local arms dealer in Asyut.108 Even more dangerous was that 
the intelligence and security forces were becoming more aware of  al-
Zummar’s role in al-Jihad. With the group increasingly exposed and thus 
105 Ibid., p. 5.
106 Ibid., p. 8.
107 Ashour, “Lions Tamed?”, p. 167.
108 Ibrāhīm, Mīthāq al-ʻamal al-Islāmī, p. 13.
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endangered, they decided to move more quickly than had been called for 
by their original, three-year plan. As a result, Farag, after meeting with 
his fellow jihadist leaders in late September 1981, decided that their first 
move must be to assassinate President Sadat. After the approval of  the 
assassination plan, Khalid al-Islambuli was able to help three members 
of  the jihadist movement to infiltrate his army unit. The assassination 
was carried out on October 6, 1981.
According to the plan, immediately after assassinating Sadat, 
the organization was supposed to move strategically on two fronts 
simultaneously, the first in the south and the second in Cairo. The Cairo 
portion of  the plan called for armed units from the organization to seize 
and hold the television and radio stations, and to broadcast a statement 
about the “victory of  Islamic revolution”.109 The move was supposed to 
be concurrent with another unit’s move to prevent or at least deter the 
police and state security forces from intervening and thus hindering the 
plan by attacking them in their barracks and at other locations in Cairo and 
Giza. In the south, the plan was to seize all of  the state security buildings 
and compounds in Asyut and thus to dominate the south entirely, before 
moving north to Cairo to reinforce their co-revolutionaries.110
But aside from successfully assassinating Sadat, the group failed 
to fully execute any of  these moves or to achieve any of  these goals. In 
Asyut, the security forces were able to put down the insurgency within two 
days, regaining control of  the region and arresting many of  the Islamist 
leaders. This included the arrest of  Khalid al-Islambuli and two other 
participants in the assassination. The government immediately formed 
different security committees consisting of  members from several security 
forces and institutions.111
While the jihadists were unsuccessful at carrying out their plan, 
according to the Minister of  the Interior Abu Basha in the 1980s, their 
readiness for action did take the government by surprise. Basha also noted 
that the government was taken aback by “the size and sophistication of  
these militant Islamist groups”.112 He asserted that the security forces 
109 Zumur, The Method of  the Islamic Jihad Group, p. 12.
110 Ibrāhīm, Mīthāq al-ʻamal al-Islāmī.
111 Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, p. 211.
112 Ibid., p. 222.
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realized for the first time that they were facing:
“A pyramid-like organization with several bases and leadership levels that 
has tremendous resources and capabilities as to members, armaments, and 
training that exceeded all of  the state’s preliminary estimates. Therefore, 
a race with time became a vital variable to prevent any additional 
exacerbation, especially after finding new and dangerous evidence about 
the movement size and capabilities. The evidence included discovering 
large stocks of  weapons of  all types…hundreds of  machine guns, rifles, 
handguns, RGB guns, hand grenades...large quantities of  ammunition 
and explosives”.113
It seems clear that the jihadists were pushed into abortive action 
due to external factors. Of  these, two were particularly important: First, 
there was the unexpected selection of  Khalid al-Islambuli to participate 
in October’s military parade. Secondly, Sadat’s massive arrest campaign 
in September 1981 made the group’s leaders increasingly worried that 
the security forces would discover their plans. They thus reasoned that 
since the state’s attack on them was inevitable, it would be wiser if  they 
moved first. 
G. Concluding Remarks
As the purpose of  this article is to explain the lineages of  changes 
in behavior of  Ikhwan al-Muslimun, the two episodes of  organizational 
development in the IM has offered several answers that illustrate when 
and how moderate and modest Islamic movement has transformed 
into radical and violent Islamic groups. It is the interaction between 
institutional changes and opportunities that explain why a radical 
ideology arose, and how extreme and violence interpretation of  Islam 
were politicized during the stabilization of  political order in Egypt. 
Ideological approaches to the phenomenon, as most of  cultural studies 
have suggested, tend to interpret the emergence of  Islamic ideology by 
focusing on their cultural dimension. As a result, there are no significant 
differences between the historical, political, and social profiles among 
the Islamic movements that developed between before and after Egypt’s 
revolution. 
A closer look at the forms of  mobilization for the struggle for 
113 Ibid., p. 220.
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Islamic state in post-Nasser’s revolution provides a more persuasive 
argument in regards to the contrast between two different periods of  
IM’s organizational development. Two aspects of  Egypt’s institutional 
history explain the variations between the IM under Hasan al-Banna 
in the 1930s and the radical and violence appeals following Qutb’s 
construction of  Islamic state ideas in the 1960s. The first involves 
attempts at the collapsing monarchy, especially in the post-independence 
Egypt, that triggered the Muslim thinkers such as Hasan al-Banna to 
form an organization in the struggle for Islamic state. The IM leadership 
constructed a new forms of  strategy for Islamic state mobilization at a 
point when they had experienced a unique sense of  community based on 
their past glory as a political power, their resistance to the secular state, 
and their strong ties with the new emerging ideologues. The conflict 
between the IM and Nasser’s regime has meant to discard the secular-
socialist option for statehood in favour of  a radical, extreme vision in 
the struggle for Islamic state. 
However, the relations between the IM and the state experienced an 
unintended transformation accompanied by the emergence of  a number 
of  groups that favored a revolutionary path: Jamāʻah al-Islāmīyah and 
Tanzim al-Jihad. Nasser’s repression of  the IM, especially severe and 
brutal suppression of  any aspirations during the 1950’s and 1960’s, and 
the subsequent political imprisonment for the newly emerging leadership, 
led the IM to conflate the ideas of  a rebellion against Sadat. Consequently, 
the use of  force during Nasser’s revolution unintentionally narrowed 
the ability to convince the Islamic activists of  the benefits of  Sadat’s 
institutional building. Nasser’s violence created opportunities for the 
marginalized IM leaders such as Qutb to develop extreme ideas drawing 
secular state as taghut and a threat for Islam. These circumstances were 
largely responsible for deepening radical and violence extremism in 
Egypt’s Islamic groups, especially during the 1970s. 
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